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Abstract
A novel information theoretic approach is proposed to solve the secret sharing prob-
lem, in which a dealer distributes one or multiple secrets among a set of participants
in such a manner that for each secret only qualified sets of users can recover this secret
by pooling their shares together while non-qualified sets of users obtain no informa-
tion about the secret even if they pool their shares together. While existing secret
sharing systems (implicitly) assume that communications between the dealer and par-
ticipants are noiseless, this paper takes a more practical assumption that the dealer
delivers shares to the participants via a noisy broadcast channel. Thus, in contrast
to the existing solutions that are mainly based on number theoretic tools, an infor-
mation theoretic approach is proposed, which exploits the channel randomness during
delivery of shares as additional resources to achieve secret sharing requirements. In
this way, secret sharing problems can be reformulated as equivalent secure communi-
cation problems via wiretap channel models, and can hence be solved by employing
powerful information theoretic security techniques. This approach is first developed
for the classic secret sharing problem, in which only one secret is to be shared. This
classic problem is shown to be equivalent to a communication problem over a com-
pound wiretap channel. Thus, the lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity of
the compound channel provide the corresponding bounds on the secret sharing rate,
and the secrecy scheme designed for the compound channel provides the secret shar-
ing schemes. The power of the approach is further demonstrated by a more general
layered multi-secret sharing problem, which is shown to be equivalent to the degraded
broadcast multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel with layered decoding and
secrecy constraints. The secrecy capacity region for the degraded MIMO broadcast
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channel is characterized, which provides the secret sharing capacity region. Further-
more, the secure encoding scheme that achieves the secrecy capacity region provides
an information theoretic scheme for sharing the secrets.
1 Introduction
In the classic secret sharing problem, a dealer intends to distribute a secret among a set of
participants such that only qualified sets of participants can correctly recover the secret by
pooling their shares together, while the non-qualified set of participants obtain no informa-
tion about the secret even if they pool their shares together. There are rich applications
of secret sharing including construction of protocols and algorithms for secure multiparty
computations [3, 4], Byzatine agreement [5], threshold cryptography [6], access control [7],
attribute-based encryption [8], and generalized oblivious transfer [9]. The existing solutions
for the secret sharing problems are mainly based on the number theoretic tools, in which
contents of the shares that the dealer delivers to the participants are specially designed in
order to guarantee the secret sharing requirements. While such approaches work well for
simple secret sharing problems, they are not readily extendable to more complicated prob-
lems, in which qualified and non-qualified sets become more complicated, and/or multiple
secrets are simultaneously shared.
While in existing secret sharing systems, it is implicitly assumed that communications
between the dealer and participants are noiseless, in this paper we take a more practical
assumption that the dealer delivers shares to the participants via a noisy broadcast channel.
Thus, we propose a novel information theoretic approach to solving secret sharing problems,
which exploits the channel randomness during delivery of shares from dealers to participants
as additional resources to achieve secret sharing requirements. In this way, secret sharing
problems can be equivalently reformulated into secure communication problems via wiretap
channel models studied in information theory [10, 11] (see [12] and [13] for more references
of these studies). More importantly, such an approach is general enough to incorporate
complex secret sharing requirements with multiple secrets and various structures of quali-
fied and non-qualified sets into wiretap models. These secure communication problems can
then be solved by employing powerful information theoretic security techniques, which thus
enable the design of secret sharing strategies. Furthermore, such an approach also allows
one to characterize the secret sharing capacity region based on the information theoretic
characterization of the secrecy capacity region of physical layer wiretap models.
We first illustrate the basic idea of our approach using the classic secret sharing problem,
in which the dealer wishes to distribute one secret to qualified sets of participants specified
by an arbitrary access structure. We propose to achieve the secret sharing property via
broadcasting the secret message from the dealer to all participants. To design a secret
sharing scheme, we construct an equivalent compound wiretap channel [14] by creating one
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virtual legitimate receiver for each qualified set (with the receiver’s output including channel
outputs from all participants in the qualified set) and creating one virtual eavesdropper
for each non-qualified set (with the eavesdropper’s output including channel outputs from
all participants in the non-qualified set). Thus, a secure communication scheme for the
equivalent compound wiretap channel guarantees that the qualified sets of participants can
decode the secret while the non-qualified sets of participants obtain a negligible amount of
information about the secret. By applying the results for the compound wiretap channel
in [14], we obtain a secret sharing scheme and characterize lower and upper bounds on the
secret sharing rate. We also characterize the secret sharing capacity for some secret sharing
scenarios.
We then demonstrate the power of our approach via a more complicated multi-secret
sharing problem. Although we here solve an example problem, our goal is to demonstrate
that this approach can be applied to more general secret sharing problems, not limited to the
one that we present in this paper. We consider the following multi-secret sharing problem
(see Fig. 4), in which multiple secrets are intended for different corresponding qualified sets
to recover in a layered fashion. More specifically, a dealer equipped with multiple antennas
wishes to distribute K secrets to K participants by broadcasting via multiple antennas over
a wireless channel. It is required that participant 1 recover the first secret, and as one more
participant joins the group to share its output, one more secret should be recovered by the
group, and this new secret should be kept secure from the smaller groups. Hence, if the
first k of the K participants share their channel outputs, they can recover the first k secrets,
while all the remaining secrets are kept confidential to the group of the first k participants.
The above problem involves sharing multiple secrets in a layered fashion, and can be very
challenging to solve using the traditional number theoretic tools. To solve this problem, fol-
lowing the approach developed above, we design a virtual receiver for each qualified set (i.e.,
sharing group) of receivers, and thus convert this secret sharing problem to a communica-
tion problem over the degraded Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) broadcast
channel with layered decoding and secrecy constraints. The requirements of the secret shar-
ing problem is exactly mapped into the layered decoding and secrecy requirements for the
communication problem. More specifically, in the communication model (see Fig. 3 for an
illustration), the transmitter wishes to transmit K messages to K (virtual) receivers. The
channel outputs at receivers naturally satisfy the degradedness condition, i.e., from receiver
K to receiver 1, the quality of their channels gets worse gradually. It is required that receiver
k decodes one more message than receiver k−1 for k = 2, . . . , K, and this additional message
should be kept secure from all receivers with worse channel outputs, i.e., with lower indices.
Design of secure communication schemes and characterization of the secrecy capacity region
for such a channel model readily provide secret sharing schemes and the corresponding secret
sharing rate regions.
Characterizing the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO broadcast
channel with layered decoding and secrecy constraints is a challenging information theoretic
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problem. Previously, there have been a number of broadcast models with layered decoding
and secrecy requirements proposed and studied. In particular, [15] studied a model (model
1) with two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper. It is required that one message be de-
coded at both receivers and kept secure from the eavesdropper, and that the second message
be decoded at one receiver and kept secure from the other receiver and the eavesdropper. [15]
studied one more model (model 2), in which the second message does not need to be kept
secure from the other receiver. Both models were further generalized in [16] in that each re-
ceiver and the eavesdropper in the above model was replaced by a group of nodes. In [15,16],
the secrecy capacity region was established for the MIMO Gaussian channels.
The model that we study in this paper generalizes model 1 in [15] to K receivers. We
characterize the secrecy capacity region for the discrete memoryless channel and the single-
input-single-output (SISO) and MIMO Gaussian channels with layered decoding and secrecy
constraints. Towards this end, the challenges lie in both the achievability and converse
proofs due to the layered secrecy constraints on more than two receivers. Our achievable
scheme is based on the stochastic encoding (i.e., binning) and heterogeneous superposition.
The major challenge of achievability arises in the analysis of leakage rates, which is much
more involved than the cases with two secure messages. Our contribution here lies in novel
generalization of the analysis of the leakage rate provided in [17] for one secure message to
multiple secure messages. On the other hand, due to the layered secrecy constraints, outer
bounds on the secrecy rates should be developed in certain recursive structures for three or
more consecutive layers of receivers. Consequently, techniques used in [15,16] for two layers
cannot be readily applied here, although some properties on matrix manipulations are useful
in our proof for the MIMO channel. Our main technical development in the converse proof
lies in the construction of a series of covariance matrices representing input resources for
layered messages such that the secrecy rates can be upper bounded as the desired recursive
forms in terms of these covariance matrices.
Due to the equivalence of the multi-secret sharing problem via the multiple-input-single-
output (MISO) broadcast channel and the secure communication problem over the degraded
MIMO broadcast channel, we hence establish the secret sharing capacity region. Further-
more, the secure encoding scheme that achieves the secret capacity region provides an infor-
mation theoretic scheme for sharing multiple secrets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the classical secret
sharing problem and its connection to an [16] [18] information theoretic secrecy model. We
then use this secret sharing problem to illustrate our information theoretic approach for
secret sharing. As further demonstration of our approach, in Sections 3 and 4, we study an
information theoretic model of the degraded broadcast channel with layered decoding and
secrecy constraints, and apply the results obtained to study a layered multi-secret sharing
problem. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude our paper with further remarks.
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2 Secret Sharing and Information Theoretic Secrecy
In this section, we first introduce the secret sharing problem, and then connect this problem
to a model studied in information theoretic secrecy.
2.1 Model of Secret Sharing
We consider the following secret sharing problem. Suppose the system consists of a dealer
and a set of participants P = {1, 2, · · · , K}. The dealer has a secret W (taken from a setW)
for the K participants to share. We define an access structure A, which contains all subsets
of P that are required to recover the secret. Each set A ∈ A is called a qualified set. We
assume that the access structure considered in this paper is monotone [19], that is if A ∈ A
and A ⊆ A1, then A1 ∈ A. For the secret sharing scheme, we require that if the users in
any qualified set A ∈ A gather their observations together, then they can recover the secret
with a negligible error probability. We define a non-access structure B such that for any set
B 6∈ B, we require that even if users in the set B gather their observations together, they
obtain negligible information about the secret message. In many applications, B = AC .
In the existing secret sharing schemes, the communications between the dealer and par-
ticipants are assumed to be noiseless as the classic secret sharing problem does not involve
channel. In this paper, we assume that the dealer and the participants are connected by
a noisy broadcast channel, as shown in Figure 1. If the dealer transmits Xn, participant
k receives Y nk , and the relationship among the input and outputs is characterized by the
transition probability distribution
PY n1 ···Y nK |Xn(y
n
1 · · · ynK |xn) =
K∏
k=1
n∏
i=1
PYk|X(yk(i)|x(i)), (1)
where x(i) is taken from a finite set X , and yk(i) is taken from a finite set Yk for k = 1, . . . , K.
Figure 1: The noisy broadcast channel.
Definition 1. A (2nR, n) code for secret sharing over the noisy broadcast channel consists
of the following:
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1. a secret set: W = {1, 2, · · · , 2nR} with the secret W uniformly distributed over W;
2. an encoder f : W → X n mapping each secret message w ∈ W to a codeword xn ∈ X n;
3. a decoder gA for each qualified set A ∈ A: {Ynk : k ∈ A} → WA.
The average block error probability for set A is
P ne,A =
1
2nR
2nR∑
w=1
Pr{wˆA 6= w|w was sent}. (2)
Definition 2. A secret sharing rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of
(2nR, n) codes such that for any ǫ > 0 the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. ∀A ∈ A, we have
P ne,A ≤ ǫ; (3)
2. ∀A ∈ B, we have
1
n
I(W ; {Y nk : k ∈ B}) ≤ ǫ. (4)
The above condition (3) requires that the decoding error probability at any qualified set
should be small, while condition (4) requires that any non-qualified set gains negligible
amount of information about the secret even if users in this set share their observations
together.
The secret sharing capacity is defined to be the maximal achievable secret sharing rate.
2.2 Connection to Wiretap Channels
In the remaining part of this section, we study the above secret sharing problem with non-
access structure B = AC. Our main idea is to connect this problem to a communication
problem over an equivalent compound wiretap channel [14] (i.e., the Wyner’s wiretap channel
model with multiple legitimate receivers and multiple eavesdroppers). Thus, secure coding
design for the equivalent compound wiretap channel can be applied to achieve secret sharing.
More specifically, for each set A ∈ A, we construct a virtual legitimate receiver VA such
that the observation at the virtual receiver is YVA = {Yk : k ∈ A}. Clearly, this receiver is
not an actual node, but an identity representing that the users in set A share their outputs.
For an access structure A, we will construct |A| virtual legitimate receivers, representing
that in each of these sharing scenarios, the secret message is required to be recovered. In
addition, for each set B ∈ B, we construct a virtual wiretapper VE,B with the observation
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YVE,B = {Yk : k ∈ B}. These virtual eavesdroppers represent that in each of these sharing
scenarios, the message should be kept secure. We note that these virtual eavesdroppers are
also not actual devices, but the identities representing that nodes in non-qualified sets share
their outputs.
We note that if A1 ⊂ A2, then X → YVA2 → YVA1 . In this case, if we design a code such
that the users in the qualified set A1 can decode the secret, then the users in the qualified
set A2 can also decode the secret. Hence, it is not necessary to construct a virtual legitimate
receiver for the qualified set A2. In this way, the number of virtual legitimate receivers can
be reduced in the constructed equivalent compound wiretap channel. Similarly, if B1 ⊂ B2,
then it is not necessary to construct a virtual wiretapper for the set B1, since if the message
is kept secure from the set B2, then it is also kept secret from the set B1. Hence, we can
also reduce the number of constructed virtual wiretappers.
Figure 2 illustrates an equivalent compound wiretap channel for a secret sharing system
with four participants. Any three participants are required to recover the secret, and hence
the access structure A includes four qualified sets {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}. We
note that the set {1, 2, 3, 4} is not included as a virtual legitimate receiver due to the rea-
son mentioned above. Furthermore, any two participants should not recover the secret,
and hence six virtual eavesdroppers are created corresponding to these non-qualified sets
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}.
Figure 2: An equivalent compound wiretap channel for a secret sharing with four partici-
pants.
Secure coding schemes for the compound wiretap channel have been proposed in [14],
which guarantee that all legitimate receivers recover the message and none of the wiretappers
obtain any information about the message. By applying the approach developed in [14] to
the equivalent compound wiretap channel that we construct for the secret sharing problem,
we obtain corresponding schemes such that each virtual legitimate receiver can decode the
message W while each virtual wiretapper has negligible information about the message W ,
which are exactly the conditions required by secret sharing. The following bounds on the
secret sharing capacity follows from the bounds on the secrecy capacity in [14].
Theorem 1. The following secret sharing rate is achievable via the broadcast channel de-
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scribed in (1)
RN = max
PUX
[
min
A
I(U ; YVA)−max
B
I(U ; YVE,B)
]
, (5)
where U is an auxiliary random variable that satisfies the Markov chain relationship:
U → X → (Y1, · · · , YK). (6)
Furthermore, the following rate is an upper-bound on the secret sharing capacity
R = min
A,B
max
PUXPYVA
YVE,B
|X
[I(U ; YVA)− I(U ; YVE,B)]. (7)
Since the secrecy capacity for the general compound wiretap channel is still unknown, the
secrecy sharing capacity for an arbitrary access structure A is not known. However, there
are some interesting special cases of the secret sharing problem, which naturally correspond
to degraded compound wiretap channels, and hence the secrecy sharing capacity can be
characterized for these cases. For example, we consider the scenario, in which the secret is
decodable only if all participants share their outputs, and is kept secret from any subset of
participants. The secret sharing capacity is given as follows.
Corollary 1. Consider the K-participant secret sharing problem over the noisy channel
PY1,...,YK |X . Suppose A contains a single set A = {1, . . . , K}. The secret sharing capacity is
given by
Cs = max
PX
min
B
[
I(X ; Y1, . . . , YK)− I(X ; YVE,B)
]
. (8)
where the set B can be any strict subset of A = {1, . . . , K}.
For the two-participant secret sharing problem, the secret sharing capacity is given by
Ctwo = max
PX
[I(X ; Y1, Y2)−max{I(X ; Y1), I(X ; Y2)}] . (9)
Another example for which we can fully characterize the secret sharing capacity is the
secret sharing problem over Gaussian broadcast channel, in which
Yk = X + Zk for k = 1, · · · , K. (10)
where Zk, for k = 1, · · · , K are independent thermal Gaussian noise variables with mean
zero and variance Nk. The dealer has an average power constraint:
1
n
E
{
n∑
i=1
X2(i)
}
≤ P. (11)
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For the Gaussian channel example, one can obtain an analytical form of the achievable
secret sharing rate for an arbitrary access structure A by setting U in (5) to be Gaussian
random variable jointly distributed with X . However, the obtained rate takes a complex
form and may not provide any insight. A simpler and often-encountered scenario is the
so-called (k,K)-secret sharing, in which any k or more users can recover the secret by
sharing their observations, while any k − 1 users obtain only negligible information from
their joint observations. This secret sharing problem can be reformulated into the secure
communication problem over a compound wiretap channel, which consists of one transmitter
with single antenna, multiple virtual legitimate receivers with each having k antennas (i.e.,
each virtual receiver corresponds to a group of k users), and multiple virtual eavesdroppers
with each having k − 1 antennas (i.e., each virtual eavesdropper corresponds to a group of
k − 1 users). For such a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) compound wiretap channel,
the secrecy capacity region can be obtained because the same Gaussian input maximizes the
secrecy capacity for each pair of legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, and hence achieves the
secrecy capacity of the compound channel. Therefore, for (k,K)-secret sharing, we obtain
the secret sharing capacity given below.
Corollary 2. For the (k,K)-secret sharing problem, the secret sharing capacity is given by
Ck,K = min
Ak,Ak−1
log
(
1 +
∑
l∈Ak P/Nl
1 +
∑
l∈Ak−1 P/Nl
)
. (12)
where Ak can be any subset of {1, . . . , K} with k indices, and Ak−1 can be any subset of
{1, . . . , K} with k − 1 indices.
For the special case when the channels to all receivers are symmetric, i.e., Nk = 1 for all
k = 1, . . . , K, the secret sharing capacity is given by
Ck,K = log
(
1 + kP
1 + (k − 1)P
)
.
Remark 1. It is interesting to note that for the special case with symmetric channels, the
secret sharing capacity depends only on k but not on K which is the total number of partic-
ipants.
3 Broadcast Channel with Layered Decoding and Se-
crecy
In order to study a more general secret sharing problem in which simultaneously sharing
multiple secrets is required as we introduce in Section 4, we need to study a broadcast
wiretap model with layered decoding and secrecy. In this section, we first introduce the
system model for this channel, and then we provide our characterization of the secrecy
capacity region for this channel. These results will then be applied to the layered multiple
secrets sharing problem in Section 4.
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3.1 System Model
Decoder 2
Decoder 1
Decoder K
 
 
p(y1,y2,...,yk|x)
W1
W2
WK
Encoder Xn
Y1
n
Y2
n
YK
n
W1W2W3...WK
W1W2W3...WK
W1W2W3...WK
Figure 3: The broadcast channel with layered decoding and secrecy
In this section, we consider the model of the degraded broadcast channel with layered
decoding and secrecy constraints (see Fig. 3), in which a transmitter transmits toK receivers.
The channel transition probability function is given by PY1···YK |X , in which X ∈ X is the
channel input and Yk ∈ Yk is the channel output of receiver k for k = 1, . . . , K. It is assumed
that the receivers have degraded outputs, i.e., Y1, · · · , YK satisfy the following Markov chain
condition, i.e., the degradedness condition:
X → YK → YK−1 → . . .→ Y2 → Y1. (13)
Hence, the quality of channels gradually degrades from receiver K to receiver 1. The trans-
mitter has K messages W1, · · · ,WK intended for the K receivers. The system is required
to satisfy the following layered decoding and secrecy constraints. For k = 1, . . . , K, re-
ceiver k needs to decode the messages W1, · · · ,Wk, and to be kept ignorant of messages
Wk+1, · · · ,WK (see Fig. 3 for an illustration). We note that the model presented here is well
motivated by application of secret sharing problems to be discussed in Section 4.
A (2nR1 , · · · , 2nRK , n) code for the channel consists of
• K message sets: Wk ∈ Wk = {1, · · · , 2nRk} for k = 1, · · · , K, which are independent from
each other and each message is uniformly distributed over the corresponding message set;
• An (possibly stochastic) encoder fn: W1 × · · · ×WK → X n;
• K decoders gnk : Ynk → (W1, · · · ,Wk) for k = 1, · · · , K.
Hence, a secrecy rate tuple (R1, · · · , RK) is said to be achievable, if there exists a sequence
of (2nR1 , · · · , 2nRK , n) codes such that both the average error probability
P ne = Pr
(∪Kk=1{(W1, · · · ,Wk) 6= gnk (Y nk )}) (14)
and the leakage rate at each receiver k for k = 1, . . . , K
1
n
I(Wk+1, · · · ,WK ; Y nk |W1, · · · ,Wk) (15)
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approach zero as n goes to infinity.
Here, the asymptotically small error probability as in (14) implies that each receiver k is
able to decode messages W1, . . . ,Wk, and asymptotically small leakage rate as in (15) for
each receiver k implies that receiver k is kept ignorant of messages Wk+1, . . . ,WK . Our goal
is to characterize the secrecy capacity region that consists of all achievable rate tuples.
We also consider the K-receiver degraded Gaussian broadcast channel, in which
Yk = X + Zk, k = 1, · · · , K, (16)
where Zk is a zero mean Gaussian noise variable with variance Nk at receiver k. We assume
that 0 < NK < NK−1 < . . . < N1. The transmitter has an average power constraint P . Since
the secrecy capacity region only depends on the marginal distribution of the channel input
and channel output at each receiver, not on the joint distribution of the channel outputs,
changing the correlation of those noise variables has no effects on the secrecy capacity region.
Hence, we can adjust the correlation of those noise variables such that the channel outputs
at each receiver and the channel input satisfy the same Markov chain as shown in (13).
We further consider the K−receiver degraded Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel. The
received signal at receiver k for one channel use is given by
Yk = X+ Zk, k = 1, . . . , K, (17)
where the channel input X, the channel output Yk and the noise Zk are r-dimensional
vectors. Furthermore, the noise variables Zk are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with
covariance matrices Σk for k = 1, . . . , K that satisfy the following order:
0 ≺ ΣK  ΣK−1  · · ·  Σ1. (18)
The channel input X is subject to a covariance constraint
E[XX⊤]  S (19)
where S ≻ 0. Since the secrecy capacity region does not depend on the correlation across
the channel outputs, we can adjust the correlation between the noise vectors such that the
channel inputs and channel outputs satisfy the following Markov chain:
X→ YK → YK−1 → . . .→ Y2 → Y1. (20)
Hence, the quality of channels gradually degrades from receiver K to receiver 1.
3.2 Characterization of Secrecy Capacity Region
In this subsection, we characterize the secrecy capacity region for the model presented in
Section 3.1. The following theorem characterized the secrecy capacity region of the discrete
memoryless channel.
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Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with layered
decoding and secrecy constraints as described in Section 3.1 contains rate tuples (R1, · · · , RK)
satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y1),
Rk ≤ I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uk; Yk−1|Uk−1), for k = 2, . . . , K − 1,
RK ≤ I(X ; YK|UK−1)− I(X ; YK−1|UK−1), (21)
for some PU1U2...UK−1X such that the following Markov chain holds
U1 → U2 → . . .→ UK−1 → X → YK → . . .→ Y1. (22)
Remark 2. By setting R1 = 0 and K = 3, Theorem 1 reduces to the results for scenario
2 in [16] with each group having a single user for the model in [20], and for the example
in [15].
Proof. The proof of the achievability and the proof of converse are provided in Appendices
A and C, respectively.
We here briefly introduce the idea of the achievable scheme, which is based on the stochastic
encoding (i.e., random binning) and superposition coding. For each message, we design one
layer of codebook. This codebook contains codewords that are divided into a number of
bins, where the bin number contains the information of the corresponding message. The
receivers that are required to decode the message can tell which bin the codeword is in with
a small probability of error, while other receivers (i.e., those with worse channel quality)
are kept ignorant of this message. These layers of codebooks are superposed together via
superposition coding. The major challenge of the achievability proof arises in the analysis of
leakage rates, which is much more involved than the cases with two secure messages studied
in [15, 16]. In our proof, we develop novel generalization of the analysis provided in [17] for
the case with one secure message to multiple secure messages. The details can be referred
to Appendix A.
We next characterize the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian broadcast chan-
nel with layered decoding and secrecy constraints. We note that although the Gaussian chan-
nel is a special case of the MIMO channel, we present the result for the Gaussian channel
here, because the result for the Gaussian channel is simpler, and hence it is easier to follow
the converse proof for this case. This helps the understanding of the more complicated proof
of the converse for the MIMO channel.
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity region of a K-user Gaussian broadcast channel with
layered decoding and secrecy constraints as described in Section 3.1 contains rate tuples
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(R1, R2, . . . , RK) satisfying
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
N1 +
∑K
j=1 Pj
N1 +
∑K
j=2 Pj
)
Rk ≤ 1
2
log
(
Nk +
∑K
j=k Pj
Nk +
∑K
j=k+1 Pj
)
− 1
2
log
(
Nk−1 +
∑K
j=k Pj
Nk−1 +
∑K
j=k+1 Pj
)
, for 2 ≤ k ≤ K, (23)
for some nonnegative variables P1, P2, . . . , PK such that
∑K
k=1 Pk ≤ P .
Proof. The achievability is based on Theorem 1 by setting (U1, . . . , UK , X) to be jointly
Gaussian distributed random variables with Uk ∼ N (0,
∑k
j=1 Pj).
The converse proof is given in Appendix D.
We now characterize the secrecy capacity region for the degraded Gaussian MIMO channel
with layered decoding and secrecy constraints in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO Broadcast channel
with layered decoding and secrecy constraints as described in Section 3.1 contains rate tuples
(R1, . . . , RK) satisfying the following inequalities:
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
|Σ1 + S|
|Σ1 + S1|
Rk ≤ 1
2
log
|Σk + Sk−1|
|Σk + Sk| −
1
2
log
|Σk−1 + Sk−1|
|Σk−1 + Sk| , for 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1
RK ≤ 1
2
log
|ΣK + SK−1|
|ΣK| −
1
2
log
|ΣK−1 + SK−1|
|ΣK−1| , (24)
for some 0  SK−1  SK−2  . . .  S2  S1  S.
We note that if the system has only single transmit antenna and receive antenna, then the
secrecy capacity region in Theorem 3 reduces to that in Theorem 2.
We further note that due to the layered secrecy constraints, the major challenge in the
converse proof for the secrecy capacity region lies in development of upper bounds in certain
recursive structures for three or more consecutive layers of receivers. Our contribution here
lies in the construction of a series of covariance matrices representing input resources for
layered messages such that the secrecy rates can be upper bounded as the desired recursive
forms in terms of these covariance matrices. The details can be referred to Appendix E.
Proof. The achievability of the region (24) follows by choosing the auxiliary random variables
U1, . . . ,UK−1,X in (21) to be jointly Gaussian distributed and satisfy the following Markov
chain condition:
U1 → U2 → . . .→ UK−1 → X, (25)
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where the covariance of Uk is set to be S − Sk for k = 1, . . . , K − 1, and the covariance of
X is set to be S.
The proof of converse is given in Appendix E.
4 Application to Sharing Multiple Secrets
Figure 4: The model of secret sharing via a broadcast channel
In this section, we apply our result in Section 3.2 for the degraded MIMO channel to
studying the following problem of sharing multiple secrets. Here, a dealer wishes to share
K secrets W1,W2, . . . ,WK with K participants via a broadcast channel (see Fig. 4). The
channel input sent by the dealer is denoted by X and the channel output received at partic-
ipant k is denoted by Yk for k = 1, . . . , K. It is required that participant 1 decodes W1, and
participants 1 and 2 decode W1 and W2 by sharing their outputs (Y1, Y2), but W2 should be
kept secure from participant 1. Such requirements extend to k participants for k = 1, . . . , K
in the sense that participants 1 to k can recover the first k messages W1, . . . ,Wk by sharing
their outputs (Y1, . . . , Yk), but the new message Wk should be secure from the first k − 1
participants. Hence, as one more participant joins the group, one more secret can be recov-
ered, and this new secret is secure from (and hence cannot be recovered by) a smaller group.
The goal is to characterize the secret sharing capacity region, which contains all possible
achievable rate tuples (R1, R2, . . . , RK) for K secrets.
This secret sharing problem involves sharing multiple secrets in a layered fashion, and is
challenging to solve using the classical approach based on number theory. Here, we solve
this problem by constructing an equivalent Gaussian MIMO broadcast model as described
in Section 3.1.
We assume that the dealer communicates to the participants via a Gaussian MISO broad-
cast channel corrupted by additive Gaussian noise variables. The dealer has K antennas and
each receiver has one antenna. The relationship of the channel input from the dealer and
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the channel outputs at all participants is given by Y1...
YK
 = H
 X1...
XK
+
 Z1...
ZK
 (26)
where H is the K × K channel matrix, which is assumed to be invertible, (Y1, . . . , YK)
are channel outputs at the K participants, (X1, . . .XK) are the channel inputs from the K
antennas of the dealer, and (Z1, . . . , ZK) is a random Gaussian vector with the covariance
matrix Σ with each entry Σij = E[ZiZj ] = σ
2
ij . We assume that the dealer’s input is subject
to a resource constraint, E[XXT ]  S.
We note that it is reasonable to assume that H is invertible in order to guarantee that
each participant’s output contains new information compared to other participants so that
new secret can be recovered when this participant joins a group.
We reformulate the above secret sharing model into a degraded MIMO broadcast com-
munication system by designing a virtual receiver for each sharing group of participants.
More specifically, we design a virtual receiver Vk for the group of the first k participants,
i.e., Vk = (Y1, . . . , Yk), for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. For technical convenience, we add K − k specially
designed outputs Y˜k+1, . . . , Y˜K to Vk so that it contains K components, i.e., the virtual
receiver Vk has K antennas. The channel outputs at those K antennas are given by,
Vk =

Y1
...
Yk
Y˜k+1
...
Y˜K

= H
 X1...
XK
+

Z1
...
Zk
Zk+1 + tZ˜k+1
...
ZK + tZ˜K

(27)
where Z˜k, 2 ≤ k ≤ K, is random Gaussian noise variables with mean zero and variance
σ˜2kk > 0, and Z˜k is independent from all other random variables. Here, t is a large enough
constant (i.e., t → ∞), so that Y˜k+1, . . . , Y˜K are fully corrupted by the noise. We define a
new random Gaussian vector ZV (k) = (Z1, . . . , Zk, Zk+1+tZ˜k+1, . . . , ZK+tZ˜K)
T and rewrite
(27) as
Vk = HX+ ZV (k), for k = 1, . . . , K. (28)
Since the channel matrix H is invertible, we have
H−1Vk = X+H−1ZV (k). (29)
By treating H−1Vk as the new channel output V′k at virtual receiver Vk, and define a new
random Gaussian noise vector Z′V (k) = H
−1ZV (k), we have
V′k = X+ Z
′
V (k), (30)
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which is equivalent to the model in (28).
We now state a lemma that provides the order of the covariance matrices of Z′V (k), denoted
by Σ′V (k), for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Lemma 1. Let Z′V (k), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, be random Gaussian vectors defined as above. The
covariance matrices of Z′V (k) satisfy the following ordering property:
Σ′V (1)  Σ′V (2)  . . .  Σ′V (K). (31)
Proof. For any 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, the covariance matrix of Z′V (k) is given by
Σ′V (k) = Cov(H
−1ZV (k))
= E[H−1ZV (k)ZV (k)T (H−1)T ]
= H−1E[ZV (k)ZV (k)T ](H−1)T
= H−1

σ211 · · · · · · · · · · · · σ21K
...
. . .
...
... σ2kk
...
... σ2k+1,k+1 + t
2σ˜2k+1,k+1
...
...
. . .
...
σ2K1 . . . . . . . . . . . . σ
2
KK + t
2σ˜2KK

(H−1)T
(32)
Hence,
Σ′V (k)−Σ′V (k + 1)
=H−1
 0 0 00 t2σ˜2k+1,k+1 0
0 0 0
 (H−1)T (33)
It is clear that Σ′V (k) − Σ′V (k + 1) is a positive semi-definite matrix and hence Σ′V (k) 
Σ′V (k + 1), for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. This concludes the proof.
Therefore, by designing virtual receivers, we reformulate the problem of secret sharing via
the MISO broadcast channel into the problem of secure communication over the degraded
MIMO broadcast channel described in Section 3.1. It can also be seen that the requirements
of the secret sharing problem is equivalent to the layered decoding and secrecy requirements
for the communication problem. It is also due to the secret sharing requirements and Lemma
1, the degradedness condition in the equivalent MIMO channel naturally holds. Thus, the
secret sharing capacity region equals the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO
broadcast channel. Thus, applying Theorem 3 we obtain the following secret sharing capacity
region.
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Corollary 3. The capacity region for the secret sharing problem described above contains
rate tuples (R1, R2, . . . , RK) satisfying
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
|Σ′V (1) + S|
|Σ′V (1) + S1|
Rk ≤ lim
t→∞
1
2
log
|Σ′V (k) + Sk−1|
|Σ′V (k) + Sk|
− 1
2
log
|Σ′V (k − 1) + Sk−1|
|Σ′V (k − 1) + Sk|
, for 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
RK ≤ lim
t→∞
1
2
log
|Σ′V (K) + SK−1|
|Σ′V (K)|
− 1
2
log
|Σ′V (K − 1) + SK−1|
|Σ′V (K − 1)|
, (34)
for some 0  SK−1  SK−2  . . .  S2  S1  S.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach based on information theoretic secrecy to
solving secret sharing problems. The basic idea is to reformulate the secret sharing problem
into a secure communication problem, and then apply techniques for the latter case to solving
the secret sharing problem. In order to illustrate the basic idea, we have first studied the
classic problem of sharing one secret among a set of participants, and provided a solution by
reformulating the secret sharing system into an equivalent compound wiretap channel with
multiple legitimate receivers and multiple eavesdroppers. We have then demonstrated the
power of our approach by solving a more complicated problem of sharing multiple secrets with
layered sharing requirements. We have characterized the secret sharing capacity region by
reformulating the problem into the problem of the degraded broadcast MIMO channel with
layered decoding and secrecy, for which we have characterized the secrecy capacity region.
Our approach can be generally applicable to solving various secret sharing problems, which
can be difficult using traditional number theoretic tools. For example, various multiple-secret
sharing problems can be reformulated into secure communication problems with multiple
confidential messages via compound MIMO broadcast channels, and hence the information
theoretic techniques and results developed in existing literature, e.g., [21–23], can be applied
to solving these secret sharing problems.
Appendix
A Achievability Proof of Theorem 1
The achievability proof is based on stochastic encoding and superposition coding. We use
random codes and fix a joint probability distribution PU1···UK−1X satisfying the Markov chain
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condition given in (22). Let T nǫ (PU1...UK−1XY1...YK ) denote the strongly jointly ǫ-typical set
based on the fixed distribution.
Random codebook generation: In the following achievability proof, for notational conve-
nience, we write X as UK , i.e., PU1···UK−1X = PU1···UK .
• Generate 2nR1 independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) un1 with distribution
∏n
i=1 p(u1,i).
Index these codewords as un1 (w1), w1 ∈ [1, 2nR1].
• For each unk−1(w1, w2, l2, · · · , wk−1, lk−1), k = 2, · · · , K, generate 2nR˜k i.i.d. sequences
unk with distribution
∏n
i=1 p(uk,i|uk−1,i). Partition these sequences into 2nRk bins, each
with 2n(R˜k−Rk) sequences. We use wk ∈ [1 : 2nRk ] to denote the bin index, and lk ∈
[1 : 2n(R˜k−Rk)] to denote the index within each bin. Hence each unk is indexed by
(w1, w2, l2, · · · , wk, lk).
The chosen codebook is revealed to the transmitter and all receivers.
Encoding: To send a message tuple (w1, w2, . . . , wK), for each 2 ≤ k ≤ K, the encoder
randomly generate lk ∈ [1 : 2n(R˜k−Rk)] based on a uniform distribution. The transmitter then
sends unK(w1, w2, l2, · · · , wK , lK).
Decoding: For k = 1, . . . , K, receiver k claims that (wˆ1, · · · , wˆk) is sent, if there exists a
unique tuple (wˆ1, wˆ2, lˆ2, · · · , wˆk, lˆk) such that
(un1(wˆ1), u
n
2(wˆ1, wˆ2, lˆ2), . . . , u
n
k(wˆ1, wˆ2, lˆ2, · · · , wˆk, lˆk), ynk ) ∈ T nǫ (PU1...UkYk). (35)
Otherwise, it declares an error.
Analysis of error probability: By the law of large numbers and the packing lemma, it can
be shown that if the following inequalities are satisfied, receiver k (for k = 1, . . . , K) can
decode messages w1, w2, . . . , wk with a vanishing error probability:
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y1),
R˜k ≤ I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K.
(36)
Analysis of leakage rate: We first compute an average of the leakage rate over the ran-
dom codebook ensemble as follows. For convenience, we let W k = (W1, . . . ,Wk), W
K
k+1 =
(Wk+1, . . . ,WK).
I(WKk+1; Y
n
k |W k, C)
= I(WK , LK ; Y nk |C)− I(W k, LK ; Y nk |WKk+1, C) +H(W k|Y nk , C)−H(W k|Y nk ,WKk+1, C)
(a)
≤ I(WK , LK ; Y nk |C)− I(W k, LK ; Y nk |WKk+1, C) + nǫn
(b)
≤ I(UnK ; Y nk |C)− I(W k, LK ; Y nk |WKk+1, C) + nǫn
= I(UnK ; Y
n
k |C)−H(W k, LK |WKk+1, C) +H(W k, LK |Y nk ,WKk+1, C) + nǫn, (37)
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where step (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, step (b) follows from the Markov chain
(WK , LK)→ (UnK , C)→ Y nk .
We bound the above three terms one by one. For the first term, we have
I(UnK ; Y
n
k |C)
(a)
= I(Unk , U
n
K ; Y
n
k |C)
= I(Unk ; Y
n
k |C) + I(UnK ; Y nk |Unk , C)
≤ H(Unk |C) + I(UnK ; Y nk |Unk , C)
= n
k∑
j=1
R˜j +H(Y
n
k |Unk , C)−H(Y nk |UnK , Unk , C)
= n
k∑
j=1
R˜j +
n∑
j=1
H(Yk,j|Unk , Y j−1k , C)−
n∑
j=1
H(Yk,j|UnK , Unk , Y j−1k , C)
(b)
≤ n
k∑
j=1
R˜j +
n∑
j=1
H(Yk,j|Uk,j)−
n∑
j=1
H(Yk,j|UK,j)
= n
k∑
j=1
R˜j + nH(Yk|Uk)− nH(Yk|UK)
= n
k∑
j=1
R˜j + nI(UK ; Yk|Uk). (38)
Where (a) follows from the Markov chain Unk → UnK → Y nk , (b) follows from the fact that
H(Yk,j|Unk , Y j−1k , C) ≤ H(Yk,j|Uk,j) and from the Markov chain (Unk , U j−1K , UnK,j+1, Y j−1k , C)→
UK,j → Yk,j.
For the second term, due to the independence of W1, · · · ,WK and L1, · · · , LK , we have
H(W k, LK |WKk+1, C) =
k∑
j=1
nR˜j +
K∑
j=k+1
n(R˜j − Rj). (39)
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We now bound the last term as follows.
H(W k, LK |Y nk ,WKk+1, C)
= H(W k|Y nk ,WKk+1, C) +H(LK |Y nk ,WK , C)
(a)
≤ H(LKk+1|Y nk ,WK , Lk, C) + 2nǫn
=
K∑
j=k+1
H(Lj|Y nk ,WK , Lj−1, C) + 2nǫn
(b)
=
K∑
j=k+1
H(Lj|Y nk ,WK , Lj−1, Unj−1, C) + 2nǫn
≤
K∑
j=k+1
H(Lj |Y nk , Unj−1,Wj) + 2nǫn
(c)
≤
K∑
j=k+1
n(R˜j −Rj − I(Uj; Yk|Uj−1)) + nǫ′n
(d)
=
K∑
j=k+1
n(R˜j − Rj)− I(UK ; Yk|Uk) + nǫ′n, (40)
where (a) follows from the chain rule and Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that
Unj−1 is a function of (C,W j−1, Lj−1), and (c) follows due to Lemma 2 with the condition that
R˜j−Rj ≥ I(Uj; Yk|Uj−1), and (d) follows from the Markov chain U1 → U2 → · · · → UK → Yk.
Lemma 2. If R˜j − Rj ≥ I(Uj ; Yk|Uj−1) for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ K, then
1
n
H(Lj |Y nk , Unj−1,Wj) ≤ R˜j − Rj − I(Uj ; Yk|Uj−1) + ǫ′′n.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Combining the analysis of the three terms together, we conclude that as n → ∞ for
1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, 1
n
I(WKk+1; Y
n
k |W k, C)→ 0, if
R˜k −Rk ≥ I(Uk; Yk−1|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K. (41)
It is also clear that the sum of the error probability and the leakage rates averaged over
the codebook ensemble converges to zero as n→∞. Hence, there exists one codebook such
that the error probability and the leakage rate converge to zero as n→∞.
Combining the bounds in (36) and (41), we obtain that the rate tuple (R1, · · · , RK) is
achievable if
R1 ≤ I(U1; Y1),
Rk ≤ I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uk; Yk−1|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K. (42)
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B Proof of Lemma 2
We first bound 1
n
H(Lj|Y nk , Unj−1, wj) for any wj, and hence, 1nH(Lj |Y nk , Unj−1,Wj) is bounded.
Fix Lj = lj and a joint typical sequence (u
n
j−1, y
n
k ) ∈ T (n)ǫ (Uj−1, Yk). We define
N(wj , lj, u
n
j−1, y
n
k ) := |{l˜j 6= lj : (Unj (wj, l˜j), unj−1, ynk ) ∈ T (n)ǫ }|. (43)
It can be shown that the expectation and variance of N satisfy the following inequalities:
2n(R˜j−Rj)−nI(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)−nδn(ǫ)−nǫn ≤ E(N(wj , lj, unj−1, ynk )) ≤ 2n(R˜j−Rj)−nI(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+nδn(ǫ)−nǫn
V ar(N(wj , lj, u
n
j−1, y
n
k )) ≤ 2n(R˜j−Rj)−nI(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+nδn(ǫ)−nǫn,
(44)
where δn(ǫ), ǫn → 0 as n→∞.
We next define the random event,
ε(wj, lj, u
n
j−1, y
n
k ) := {N(wj, lj , unj−1, ynk ) ≥ 2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ)−ǫn/2)+1}.
Using Chebyshev’s inequality, we obtain
P
(
ε(wj, lj , u
n
j−1, y
n
k )
)
= P
(
N(wj, lj , u
n
j−1, y
n
k ) ≥ 2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ)−ǫn/2)+1
)
≤ P
(
N(wj , lj, u
n
j−1, y
n
k ) ≥ E(N(wj, lj , unj−1, ynk )) + 2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ)−ǫn/2)
)
≤ P
(
|N(wj , lj, unj−1, ynk )−E(N(wj , lj, unj−1, ynk ))| ≥ 2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ)−ǫn/2)
)
≤ V ar(N(wj , lj, u
n
j−1, y
n
k ))
22n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ)−ǫn/2)
≤ 1
2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ))
(45)
which goes to zero as n→∞ if R˜j − Rj ≥ I(Uj; Yk|Uj−1). This implies that
P
(
ε(wj, lj, u
n
j−1, y
n
k )
)
→ 0
as n→∞.
For each message wj, we define the following random variable and event:
N(wj) := |{l˜j : (Unj (wj, l˜j), Y nk , Unj−1) ∈ T (n)ǫ , l˜j 6= Lj}|
ε(wj) := {N(wj) ≥ 2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δn(ǫ)−ǫn/2)+1}
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Finally, define the indicator random variable E(wj) := 0 if (U
n
j (wj, Lj), Y
n
k , U
n
j−1) ∈ T (n)ǫ and
ε(wj)
c occurs; and E(wj) := 1, otherwise. Therefore, we have
P (E(wj) = 1) ≤ P
(
(Unj (wj, Lj), U
n
j−1, Y
n
k ) /∈ T (n)ǫ
)
+ P (ε(wj)) . (46)
It is clear that the first term in (46) goes to zero as n → ∞. For the second term in (46),
we have
P (ε(wj))
≤
∑
(unj−1,y
n
k
)∈T (n)ǫ
P
(
unj−1, y
n
k
)
P
(
ε(wj)|unj−1, ynk
)
+ P
(
(Unj−1, Y
n
k ) /∈ T (n)ǫ
)
=
∑
(unj−1,y
n
k
)∈T (n)ǫ
∑
lj
P
(
unj−1, y
n
k
)
P
(
lj|unj−1, ynk
)
P
(
ε(wj)|unj−1, ynk , lj
)
+ P
(
(Unj−1, Y
n
k ) /∈ T (n)ǫ
)
→ 0, if R˜j − Rj ≥ I(Uj ; Yk|Uj−1). (47)
Therefore,
H(Lj|wj, Unj−1, Y nk )
≤ H(Lj , E(wj)|wj, Unj−1, Y nk )
≤ H(E(wj)) +H(Lj|wj, Unj−1, Y nk , E(wj))
≤ 1 + P (E(wj) = 1)H(Lj|wj, Y nk , Unj−1, E(wj) = 1) +H(Lj|wj, Y nk , Unj−1, E(wj) = 0)
≤ 1 + P (E(wj) = 1)n(R˜j − Rj) + log 2n(R˜j−Rj−I(Uj ;Yk|Uj−1)+δ(ǫ)−ǫ/2)+1
= 1 + n(R˜j −Rj)P (E(wj) = 1) + n(R˜j − Rj − I(Uj; Yk|Uj−1) + δ(ǫ)− ǫ/2) + 1 (48)
Following from (48), we obtain,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Lj|wj, Unj−1, Y nk ) ≤ R˜j − Rj − I(Uj ; Yk|Uj−1) + δ′(ǫ), (49)
where δ′(ǫ)→ 0 as n→∞. This concludes the proof.
C Converse Proof of Theorem 1
By Fano’s inequality and the secrecy requirements, we have the following inequalities
H(Wk|Y nk ) ≤ nǫn, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K (50)
1
n
I(Wk+1, . . . ,WK ; Y
n
k |W1, . . . ,Wk) ≤ ǫn, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. (51)
We let Y i−1k := (Yk,1, . . . , Yk,i−1), and Y
n
k,i+1 := (Yk,i+1, . . . , Yk,n). We set Uk,i := {W1, . . . ,Wk,
Y i−1k , Y
n
k−1,i+1} for k = 1, . . . ,K where Y n0 = φ. It is easy to verify that (U1,i, . . . , UK−1,i,Xi) satisfy
the following Markov chain condition:
U1,i → U2,i → . . .→ UK−1,i → Xi → YK,i → . . .→ Y1,i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (52)
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We first bound the rate R1. Since there is no secrecy constraint for W1, following the standard
steps, we obtain the following bound:
nR1 = H(W1) = I(W1;Y
n
1 ) +H(W1|Y n1 )
≤ I(W1;Y n1 ) + nǫn =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|Y i−11 ) + nǫn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1i) + nǫn =
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i;Y1,i) + nǫn. (53)
For the message Wk, 2 ≤ k ≤ K, we derive the following bound:
nRk =H(Wk) = H(Wk|W k−1)
=I(Wk;Y
n
k |W k−1) +H(Wk|W k−1, Y nk )
(a)
≤I(Wk;Y nk |W k−1) + nǫn
(b)
≤I(Wk;Y nk |W k−1) + 2nǫn − I(Wk;Y nk−1|W k−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Wk;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k ) + 2nǫn −
n∑
i=1
I(Wk;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y nk−1,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk, Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k )− I(Wk, Y i−1k ;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y nk−1,i+1)
− I(Y nk−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k, Y i−1k ) + I(Y i−1k ;Yk−1,i|W k, Y nk−1,i+1)
]
+ 2nǫn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y nk−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k ) + I(Wk;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1)
− I(Y i−1k ;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y nk−1,i+1)− I(Wk;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1)
]
+ 2nǫn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1)− I(Wk;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1)
]
+ 2nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk, Y
i−1
k , Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1)− I(Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1)
− I(Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1) + I(Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1)
]
+ 2nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk, Y
i−1
k , Y
n
k−1,i+1, Y
i−1
k−1 , Y
n
k−2,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1)
− I(Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1)
− I(Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1) + I(Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1)
]
+ 2nǫn
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=n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk, Y
i−1
k , Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
− I(Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1) + I(Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1)
− I(Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1)− I(Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1)
+ I(Y i−1k , Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1)
]
+ 2nǫn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk, Y
i−1
k , Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
− I(Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
− I(Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
+ I(Y i−1k , Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
]
+ 2nǫn
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wk, Y
i−1
k , Y
n
k−1,i+1;Yk,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
− I(Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−1,i+1;Yk−1,i|W k−1, Y i−1k−1 , Y nk−2,i+1)
]
+ 2nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uk,i;Yk,i|Uk−1,i)− I(Uk,i;Yk−1,i|Uk−1,i)
]
+ 2nǫn (54)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from (51), i.e., the secrecy constraint, (c)
and (d) follow from the sum identity property in [11, Lemma 7], and (e) and (f) follows from the
degradedness condition (13).
For k = K, we further derive (54),
nRK ≤
n∑
i=1
I(UK,i;YK,i|UK−1,i)− I(UK,i;YK−1,i|UK−1,i) + 2nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
I(UK,i,Xi;YK,i|UK−1,i)− I(UK,i,Xi;YK−1,i|UK−1,i)
− I(Xi;YK,i|UK,i) + I(Xi;YK−1,i|UK,i) + 2nǫn (55)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;YK,i|UK−1,i)− I(Xi;YK−1,i|UK−1,i) + 2nǫn,
where the last step follows from (52) and (13). The proof of the converse is completed by defining
a uniformly distributed random variable Q ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and setting Uk , (Q,Uk,Q), Yk , Yk,Q,
for k ∈ [1 : K], and X , (Q,XQ).
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D Proof of Converse of for Theorem 2
We continue the bounds proved for the discrete memoryless channel in their single-letter forms.
We first bound R1 as follows:
R1 ≤I(U1;Y1) + ǫn ≤ 1
2
log 2πe(P +N1)− h(Y1|U1) + ǫn, (56)
where h(Y1|U1) will be bounded later.
Following from (54), we have,
R2 ≤I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(U2;Y1|U1) + 2ǫn
=h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1)− (h(Y2|U1, U2)− h(Y1|U1, U2)) + 2ǫn (57)
It can be shown as (140) in [16] that
1
2
log
N2
N1
≤ h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1) ≤ 1
2
log
P +N2
P +N1
. (58)
Hence, there must exist an α1, 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1 such that
h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1) = 1
2
log
(1− α1)P +N2
(1− α1)P +N1 . (59)
Due to the degradedness condition, it is clear that −I(U2;Y2|U1)+ I(U2;Y1|U1) ≤ 0, which implies
h(Y2|U1, U2)− h(Y1|U1, U2) ≤ h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1). (60)
Hence, there must exist an α2, 0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1− α1, such that
h(Y2|U1, U2)− h(Y1|U1, U2) = 1
2
log
(1− α1 − α2)P +N2
(1− α1 − α2)P +N1 . (61)
Substituting (59) and (61) into (57), we obtain
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
α2P
(1− α1 − α2)P +N2
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
α2P
(1− α1 − α2)P +N1
)
. (62)
In order to bound h(Y1|U1), we note that Y1 can be written as Y2 + Z ′, where Z ′ is Gaussian with
variance N1 −N2. By the entropy power inequality [24], we have
22h(Y1|U1) ≥ 22h(Y2|U1) + 22h(Z′|U1). (63)
Using (59) and (63), we obtain
H(Y1|U1) ≥ 1
2
log(2πe((1 − α1)P +N1)). (64)
Substituting (64) into (56), we obtain
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
α1P
(1− α1)P +N1
)
. (65)
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We next bound R3 and have
R3 ≤h(Y3|U1, U2)− h(Y2|U1, U2)
− (h(Y3|U1, U2, U3)− h(Y2|U1, U2, U3)) + 2ǫn
(66)
We let
√
t =
√
N2−N3
N1−N3 , and write Z2 = Z3 +
√
tZ˜, where Z˜ is Gaussian with variance N1 −N3. By
the entropy power inequality in [25],
22h(Y2|U1,U2) = 22h(Y3+
√
tZ˜|U1,U2) ≥ (1− t)22h(Y3|U1,U2) + t22h(Y1|U1,U2), (67)
which, jointly with (61), implies that
h(Y3|U1, U2)− h(Y2|U1, U2) ≤ 1
2
log
(1− α1 − α2)P +N3
(1− α1 − α2)P +N2 . (68)
Using the same argument for obtaining (61), we can show that there exists 0 < α3 < 1− α1 − α2,
such that
h(Y3|U1, U2, U3)− h(Y2|U1, U2, U3) = 1
2
log
(1− α1 − α2 − α3)P +N3
(1− α1 − α2 − α3)P +N2 . (69)
Substituting (68) and (69) into (66), we obtain the desired bound on R3.
It can be seen that the technique for bounding R3 can be extended to bound R4, . . . , RK , and
we hence complete the proof by noting that Pk = αkP for k = 1, . . . ,K.
E Proof of Converse for Theorem 3
In this proof, we first introduce some necessary definitions and useful lemmas in the previous
studies [16,18]. We then present our main proof.
E.1 Preliminaries
Definition 1. [16] Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated length-n random vector pair with well
defined densities. The conditional Fisher information matrix of X given U is defined as
J(X|U) = E[ρ(X|U)ρ(X|U)T ] (70)
where the expectation is taken over the joint density f(u,x), and the conditional score function
ρ(x|u) is given by
ρ(x|u) = ∇ log f(x|u)
=
[
∂ log fU (x|u)
∂x1
· · · ∂ log fU (x|u)
∂xn
]T
.
(71)
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Lemma 3. [16, Theorem 11] Let (Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4) be Gaussian random vectors with covariance
matrices Σ1, Σ2, Σ3, Σ4, respectively, where
Σ4  Σ3  Σ2  Σ1. (72)
Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily dependent random vector pair, which is independent of the Gaussian
random vectors (Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4), and the second moment of X be constrained as E[XX
T ]  S.
Then, for any feasible (U,X), for any Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4 satisfying the order in (72), there exists a
positive semidefinite matrix K∗ such that K∗  S, and
h(X+ Z2|U)− h(X+ Z3|U) = 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ2|
|K∗ +Σ3| , (73)
and
h(X+ Z1|U)− h(X+ Z3|U) ≤ 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ1|
|K∗ +Σ3| , (74)
h(X+ Z3|U)− h(X+ Z4|U) ≥ 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ3|
|K∗ +Σ4| . (75)
Lemma 4. [18] Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated random vector pair, and the second moment
of X is constrained as E[XXT ]  S. Let Z1, Z2 be Gaussian random vectors that are independent
from (U,X), and have mean zero and covariance matrices Σ1, Σ2, respectively, where Σ1  Σ2.
Then
1
2
log
|J(X+ Z1|U)−1|
|J(X+ Z1|U)−1 +Σ2 −Σ1| ≤ h(X+ Z1|U)− h(X+ Z2|U)
≤ 1
2
log
|J(X+ Z2|U)−1 +Σ1 −Σ2|
|J(X+ Z2|U)−1| . (76)
Proof. The proof of the unconditioned version of Lemma 4 is given in [18] in part B of Section V.
The proof can be generalized to the conditioned version by applying mathematical tools given in
part D of Section V of [18].
Lemma 5. [18, Lemma 17] Let (V,U,X) be n−dimentional random vectors with well-defined
densities. Moreover, assume that the partial derivatives of f(u|v,x) with respect to xi, i = 1, . . . , n,
exist and satisfy
max
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∂f(u|x,v)∂xi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ g(u), (77)
for some integrable function g(u). If (V,U,X) satisfy the Markov chain V→ U→ X, then
J(X|U)  J(X|V). (78)
Lemma 6. [18, Lemma 10] Consider the function
r(t) =
1
2
log
|A+B+ t∆|
|A+ t∆| , 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. (79)
where A, B, ∆ are real symmetric matrices, and A ≻ 0, B  0, ∆  0. Then r(t) is continuous
and monotonically decreasing with respect to t.
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Lemma 7. [18] Suppose (U,X) is a random vector pair with arbitrary joint distribution and the
second order moment of X satisfies E(XXT )  S. Let Z be a random Gaussian vector that is
independent from U and X and has mean zero and covariance Σ. Then we have
0  J(X+ Z|U)−1 −Σ  S. (80)
Lemma 8. [18] Suppose (U,X) is a random vector pair with arbitrary joint distribution and the
second order moment of X satisfies E(XXT )  S. Let Z1,Z2 be random Gaussian vectors that are
independent from U and X and have mean zero and covariance matrices Σ1  Σ2. Then we have
J(X+ Z1|U)−1 +Σ2 −Σ1 − J(X+ Z2|U)−1  0. (81)
The proof of Lemma 8 follows the arguments in the proof of Lemma 6 in [18] for the unconditional
case, but using Corollary 4 in [18] for the conditional case.
E.2 Main Proof
Following the converse proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix C, we have the inequalities as follows:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
Rk ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uk;Yk−1|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
(82)
where the random variables satisfy the Markov chain condition in (22).
We first derive the bounds on R2 and R3 in order to show that the bounding techniques can be
extended to prove the bounds on R4, . . . , RK . We then derive the bound on R1.
To bound R2, we start with (82), and have
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(U2;Y1|U1)
(a)
= h(Y2|U1)− h(Y2|U2)− (h(Y1|U1)− h(Y1|U2))
= (h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1))− (h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2)), (83)
where (a) follows from the Markov chain condition in (22).
Following from Lemma 4, we have the following upper bound and lower bound on h(Y2|U1) −
h(Y1|U1).
1
2
log
|J(X+ Z2|U1)−1|
|J(X+ Z2|U1)−1 +Σ1 −Σ2| ≤ h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1)
≤ 1
2
log
|J(X+ Z1|U1)−1 +Σ2 −Σ1|
|J(X+ Z1|U1)−1| . (84)
Define
A = J(X+ Z2|U1)−1,
B = Σ1 −Σ2,
∆ = J(X+ Z1|U1)−1 +Σ2 −Σ1 − J(X+ Z2|U1)−1,
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and
r(t) =
1
2
log
|A+B+ t∆|
|A+ t∆| .
Therefore, (84) can be rewritten into,
− r(0) ≤ h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1) ≤ −r(1). (85)
It can be verified that A ≻ 0, B  0, and ∆  0. In particular, ∆  0 is due to Lemma 8.
Following from Lemma 6, r(t) is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function in t. Hence,
(85) implies that there must exist a constant t1 with 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 1, such that
h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1) = −r(t1). (86)
We define
S1 : = A+ t1∆−Σ2
= J(X+ Z2|U1)−1 + t1(J(X+ Z1|U1)−1 +Σ2 −Σ1 − J(X+ Z2|U1)−1)−Σ2. (87)
Therefore,
h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1) = −r(t1) = 1
2
log
|S1 +Σ2|
|S1 +Σ1| . (88)
It can be seen that S1 satisfies A−Σ2  S1  A+∆−Σ2. Following Lemma 7, we have
0  J(X+ Z2|U1)−1 −Σ2 = A−Σ2  S1  A+∆−Σ2 = J(X+ Z1|U1)−1 −Σ1  S, (89)
which implies
0  S1  S. (90)
We next study the term h(Y2|U2)−h(Y1|U2). Due to the Markov chain condition (22), it is clear
that −I(U2;Y2|U1) + I(U2;Y1|U1) ≤ 0, which implies that
h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2) ≤ h(Y2|U1)− h(Y1|U1) = 1
2
log
|S1 +Σ2|
|S1 +Σ1| . (91)
Applying Lemma 4, we obtain
1
2
log
|J(X+ Z2|U2)−1|
|J(X+ Z2|U2)−1 +Σ1 −Σ2| ≤ h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2)
≤ 1
2
log
|J(X+ Z2|U2)−1 +Σ2 −Σ1|
|J(X+ Z1|U2)−1| . (92)
Combining (91) and(92), we have
1
2
log
|J(X+ Z2|U2)−1|
|J(X+ Z2|U2)−1 +Σ1 −Σ2| ≤ h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2) ≤
1
2
log
|S1 +Σ2|
|S1 +Σ1| . (93)
We now consider the function
r(t) =
1
2
log
|A+B+ t∆|
|A+ t∆| (94)
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with A, B and ∆ being redefined as,
A = J(X+ Z2|U2)−1
B = Σ1 −Σ2
∆ = S1 +Σ2 − J(X+ Z2|U2)−1,
(95)
whereA ≻ 0, B  0, and∆  0. In order to show∆  0, we show that S1  J(X+Z2|U2)−1−Σ2.
Using Lemma 5, we have
J(X+ Z2|U2)  J(X+ Z2|U1). (96)
Hence,
J(X+ Z2|U1)−1  J(X+ Z2|U2)−1. (97)
Since S1  J(X+ Z2|U1)−1 −Σ2, we have
S1  J(X+ Z2|U2)−1 −Σ2. (98)
Thus, (93) can be rewritten as
− r(0) ≤ h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2) ≤ −r(1). (99)
Since the function r(t) is monotone and continuous, there exists a constant t2 with 0 ≤ t2 ≤ 1 such
that h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2) = −r(t2). Let S2 = A+ t2∆−Σ2, and obtain
h(Y2|U2)− h(Y1|U2) = −r(t2) = 1
2
log
|S2 +Σ2|
|S2 +Σ1| (100)
It can be seen that
J(X+ Z2|U2)−1 −Σ2 = A−Σ2  S2  A+∆−Σ2 = S1. (101)
Therefore, combining (88) and (100), we obtain
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
|S1 +Σ2|
|S1 +Σ1| −
1
2
log
|S2 +Σ2|
|S2 +Σ1|
=
1
2
log
|S1 +Σ2|
|S2 +Σ2| −
1
2
log
|S1 +Σ1|
|S2 +Σ1| .
(102)
We next derive an upper bound on R3, which is a necessary step to show that the proof techniques
can be iteratively extended to bound R4, . . . , RK . Following from (82), we have
R3 ≤ h(Y3|U2)− h(Y2|U2)− (h(Y3|U3)− h(Y2|U3)). (103)
Using Lemma 3 and (100), we obtain
h(Y3|U2)− h(Y2|U2) ≤ 1
2
log
|S2 +Σ3|
|S2 +Σ2| . (104)
Similarly to (91), due to the Markov chain condition (22), we have
h(Y3|U3)− h(Y2|U3) ≤ h(Y3|U2)− h(Y2|U2). (105)
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Using Lemma 4 and (104) and (105), we have,
1
2
log
|J(X+ Z3|U3)−1|
|J(X+ Z3|U3)−1 +Σ2 −Σ3| ≤ h(Y3|U3)− h(Y2|U3) ≤
1
2
log
|S2 +Σ3|
|S2 +Σ2| . (106)
It can be shown that S2  J(X+Z3|U3)−1−Σ3 by using Lemma 5 and Lemma 8. Then following
the similar arguments that yield (100), we can show that there exists an S3, such that 0  S3 
S2  S1  S and
h(Y3|U3)− h(Y2|U3) = 1
2
log
|S3 +Σ3|
|S3 +Σ2| . (107)
Therefore, substituting (104) and (107) into (103), we obtain
R3 ≤ 1
2
log
|S2 +Σ3|
|S2 +Σ2| −
1
2
log
|S3 +Σ3|
|S3 +Σ2|
=
1
2
log
|S2 +Σ3|
|S3 +Σ3| −
1
2
log
|S2 +Σ2|
|S3 +Σ2| .
(108)
Using techniques similar to those for bounding R2 and R3, we can derive the desired bounds on
R4, . . . , RK iteratively.
Finally, we bound the rate R1. We introduce a virtual receiver Y0 = X + Z0, where Z0 is a
Gaussian vector with the covariance matrix of Σ0 = tΣ1 with t ≥ 1. Hence, Σ0  Σ1. Following
from (88) and Lemma 3, we have,
h(Y0|U1)− h(Y1|U1) ≤ 1
2
log
|S1 +Σ0|
|S1 +Σ1| , (109)
for any t ≥ 1. On the other hand, we have
1
2
log(2πe)r |Σ0| = h(Z0) ≤ h(Y0|U1) ≤ h(Y0) ≤ 1
2
log(2πe)r |S+Σ0|, (110)
which implies that
1
2
log
|Σ0|
|S1 +Σ0| ≤ h(Y0|U1)−
1
2
log(2πe)r |S1 +Σ0| ≤ 1
2
log
|S+Σ0|
|S1 +Σ0| . (111)
As t→∞, 12 log |Σ0||S1+Σ0| → 0 and 12 log
|S+Σ0|
|S1+Σ0| → 0. Hence, h(Y0|U1)− 12 log(2πe)r|S1 +Σ0| → 0
as t→∞. Since (109) holds for any t ≥ 1, we have h(Y1|U1) ≥ 12 log(2πe)r |S1 +Σ1|.
Following from (82),
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1)
= h(Y1)− h(Y1|U1)
≤ 1
2
log(2πe)r |S+Σ1| − 1
2
log(2πe)r|S1 +Σ1|
=
1
2
log
|S+Σ1|
|S1 +Σ1| ,
(112)
which completes the proof.
31
References
[1] L. Lai, Y. Liang, W. Du, and S. Shamai (Shitz). Secret sharing via noisy broadcast channels.
In Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Saint-Petersburg,
Russia, July-August 2011.
[2] S. Zou, Y. Liang, L. Lai, and S. Shamai (Shitz). Layered decoding and secrecy over degraded
broadcast channels. In Proc. IEEE 14th Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless
Communications (SPAWC), pages 679–683, 2013.
[3] A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In Proc. 23rd Annual Symposium on Founda-
tions of Computer Science, pages 160–164, 1982.
[4] A. C. Yao. How to generate and exchange secrets. In Proc. 27th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, pages 162–167, 1986.
[5] M.O. Rabin. Randomized byzantine generals. In Proc. 24th Annual Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, pages 403–409, 1983.
[6] Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel. Shared generation of authenticators and signatures. In Proc.
Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
457–469. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992.
[7] M. Naor and A. Wool. Access control and signatures via quorum secret sharing. In Proc.
3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 157–168, New
York, NY, USA, 1996.
[8] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained
access control of encrypted data. In Proc. 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security (CCS), pages 89–98, New York, NY, USA, 2006.
[9] B. Shankar, K. Srinathan, and C. P. Rangan. Alternative protocols for generalized oblivious
transfer. In Proc. 9th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking
(ICDCN), pages 304–309, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[10] A. D. Wyner. The wire-tap channel. Bell Syst. Tech. J., 54(8):1355–1387, October 1975.
[11] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner. Broadcast channels with confidential messages. IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, 24(3):339–348, May 1978.
[12] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz). Information theoretic security. Foundations
and Trends in Communications and Information Theory, 5(4-5):355–580, Now Publishers,
Hanover, MA, USA, 2008.
[13] M. Bloch and J. Barros. Physical-Layer Security: From Information Theory to Security Engi-
neering. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[14] Y. Liang, G. Kramer, H. Vincent Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz). Compound wiretap channels.
EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun. Netw., Volume 2009, Article ID 142374.
[15] R. Liu, T. Liu, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz). A vector generalization of Costa’s entropy-
power inequality with applications. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 56(4):1865 –1879, April
2010.
32
[16] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus. Degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channels. IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, 58(9):5681–5698, 2012.
[17] A. El Gamal and Y.-H. Kim. Network Information Theory. Cambridge University Press, New
York, 2012.
[18] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus. The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 57(4):2083–2114, 2011.
[19] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, A. Giorgio Gaggia, and U. Vaccaro. New bounds on the information
rate of secret sharing schemes. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 41(2):549–554, 1995.
[20] G. Bagherikaram, A. S. Motahari, and A. K. Khandani. Secure broadcasting : The secrecy rate
region. In Proc. 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication Control and Computing,
pages 834–841, Sept 2008.
[21] H. Weingarten, T. Liu, S. Shamai (Shitz), Y. Steinberg, and P. Viswanath. The capacity
region of the degraded multiple-input multiple-output compound broadcast channel. IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory, 55(11):5011–5023, Nov 2009.
[22] M. Kobayashi, Y. Liang, S. Shamai (Shitz), and M. Debbah. On the compound MIMO
broadcast channels with confidential messages. In Proc. IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1283–1287, June 2009.
[23] M.A. Maddah-Ali. On the degrees of freedom of the compound MISO broadcast channels with
finite states. In Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages
2273–2277, June 2010.
[24] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. Wiley-Interscience, New
York, NY, USA, 1991.
[25] M. Costa. A new entropy power inequality. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 31(6):751 – 760,
Nov 1985.
33
0 5 10 15 20
0.26
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
P
C k
,J
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k
C k
,J
Transmitter
Eavesdroppers
Legitimate
Receivers
nX
nY1 L1
E1nZ1
n
JY LJ
1W
JW
1W
JW
1W JW
EKnKZ 1W JW
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
d2
C 2
J
2
1
nX
nY1
nY2
n
JY
Transmitter
nx11
nx12
nx21
1=W
2=W
nRW 2=
Transmitter
Eavesdroppers
Legitimate
Receivers
nX
nY1
nY2
n
JY
nZ1
nZ2
n
KZ
L1
L2
LJ
E1
E2
EK
Transmitter
͙͙
͙͙
virtual 
legitimate 
receivers
virtual 
wiretappers
2
1
3
4
1
32
1
42
1
34
4
32
1 2
1 4
1 3
4 2
3 2
3 4
X 1Y
2Y
3Y
4Y
1AV
Y 2A
VY
3AV
Y
4AV
Y
3BV
Y
6BV
Y
1BV
Y
5BV
Y
2BV
Y
4BV
Y
Virtua
Legit
Rece
Indiv
Eave
Virtu
Eave
Dealer
Alice Bob
Untrusted relays
͙͙
Dealer
User 1
User 2
1d
2d
